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Executive Summary 
 
Some economic observers argue “structural unemployment” has increased in the wake of the Great 
Recession.  
 
Structural unemployment refers to unemployment that reflects supply constraints in the economy: 
workers whose skills or geographic location don’t match with employers’ desires. Structural 
unemployment differs from cyclical unemployment, which is associated with fluctuations in 
aggregate demand related to swings in the business cycle. 
 
The distinction between structural and cyclical unemployment has crucial implications for economic 
policy. If unemployment is “structural” then government policy that seeks to increase demand – low 
interest rates or fiscal stimulus, for example – will have little or no effect on the national 
unemployment rate and could even make matters worse by igniting inflation. If unemployment is 
“cyclical,” however, then expansionary macroeconomic policy can lower unemployment 
substantially with little or no risk of inflation. 
 
We find little support for either of two arguments that suggest that structural unemployment has 
been on the rise.  
 
The first argument focuses on the large increase in unemployment among construction workers. 
According to this view, the large supply of unemployed construction workers will never find work in 
construction again and lack the skills needed to find new jobs in other sectors of the economy.  
 
Based on data from the January 2010 Displaced Workers Survey (DWS), the experience of 
construction workers, however, is remarkably similar to workers displaced from other sectors.  
 
• Slightly more construction workers (56.3 percent) than non-construction workers (55.5 
percent) found a new job at some point between the time they were displaced and the time 
they were interviewed for the DWS.  
 
• On average, construction workers also held slightly more jobs since being displaced (0.80) 
than non-construction workers (0.71).  
 
• Construction workers also appear to be more geographically mobile than non-construction 
workers. About one-in-ten construction workers had moved to a different city or county 
after being displaced (10.3 percent), compared to only about one-in-twelve non-
construction workers (8.5 percent).  
 
• Construction workers were also more likely to “move to look for work or to take a 
different job” (6.1 percent) than workers displaced from other sectors (5.1 percent). 
 
• Displaced construction workers were only slightly less likely to be employed at the time of 
the DWS interview (46.7 percent) than displaced workers from other sectors (47.9 
percent). 
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• Displaced construction workers also appear to be as willing to accept pay cuts as workers 
displaced from other sectors. Exactly the same share of displaced, formerly full-time 
construction and non-construction workers (38.2 percent) who were re-employed at the 
time of the DWS interview had taken a pay cut of more than 20 percent at their new job. 
Roughly comparable shares of both groups of workers took a pay cut of between zero and 
20 percent (23.2 percent for construction, 27.3 for non-construction). 
 
A second argument suggesting that structural unemployment has increased is that falling house 
prices have reduced the mobility of unemployed workers. This situation has created “housing lock” 
where unemployed workers, who would otherwise relocate to regions with jobs, are stuck in high 
unemployment areas. 
 
The DWS data suggest that house prices have had almost no observable impact on displaced 
workers’ likelihood to move. Displaced workers in states that experienced a large decline in the 
house price index were no more likely to stay (90.7 percent) than were displaced workers who lost 
their jobs in states with smaller house-prices declines (91.7 percent) or house-price increases (91.8 
percent). The same is true when we divide states into five groups by the change in the house price 
index. States in all five fifths of house price changes had similar staying rates, varying from 90.7 to 
92.6 percent. Displaced workers in the ten states that saw the biggest house-price declines – 
including Nevada, California, Florida, Arizona, and Michigan – had essentially the same probability 
of not moving after displacement (90.7 percent) as displaced workers in the ten states with the best 
performing housing markets (91.5 percent). 
 
Even if “housing lock” were a more serious problem, it might still be possible to address any related 
unemployment using expansionary macroeconomic policy. Unemployment connected to housing 
lock may be “structural” in some sense, but the structural barrier is in the housing market, not the 
labor or product markets. Some regional markets have experienced local declines in demand that are 
related to the collapse in the housing market. A resurgence of demand at the national level, as would 
happen with expansionary macroeconomic policies, would potentially restore demand in depressed 
regions without requiring workers to relocate and without creating inflationary pressures. 
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“[T]he Fed does not have a means to transform construction workers into manufacturing workers.” 
– Narayana Kocherlakota, President, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, August 17, 20101 
 
“You can’t change the carpenter into a nurse easily... Monetary policy can’t retrain people. Monetary 
policy can’t fix those problems.” – Charles Plosser, President, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 
February 14, 20112 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In 2006, the U.S. housing bubble peaked and home prices began to fall in most real-estate markets 
across the country.3 In response, employment in the construction sector dropped sharply, with job 
losses eventually totaling more than two million.4 These initial job losses in construction reduced 
demand in the economy, generating further job losses in other sectors. But, the decline in house 
prices has done the most damage. The $6 trillion fall in housing equity since the peak has led 
households to cut spending sharply, reducing GDP by about 2.5 percent relative to pre-crash levels.5 
 
Some economic observers argue that two particular features of the Great Recession – both rooted in 
the downturn’s origins in residential housing – have led to an increase in “structural 
unemployment.” Economists have long distinguished between “structural” and “cyclical” 
unemployment. Cyclical unemployment refers to unemployment in response to temporary declines 
in demand (consumption, investment, government spending, or exports) associated with the 
business cycle. Structural unemployment refers to unemployment that reflects supply constraints in 
the economy: workers whose skills or geographic location don’t match with employers’ desires.6 The 
distinction has crucial implications for economic policy. If unemployment is “structural” then 
government policy that seeks to increase demand – low interest rates or fiscal stimulus, for example 
– will have little or no effect on the national unemployment rate and could even make matters worse 
by igniting inflation. If unemployment is “cyclical,” however, then expansionary macroeconomic 
policy can lower unemployment substantially with little or no risk of inflation. 
 
                                                 
1 See http://www.minneapolisfed.org/news_events/pres/speech_display.cfm?id=4525 
2 Mary Anastasia O’Grady, “The Fed’s Easy Money Skeptic,” The Wall Street Journal, February 14, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704709304576124132413782592.html. 
3 According to the National Bureau of Economic Research, the recession began in December 2007, about nine months 
before the crisis in financial markets reached its peak in the fall of 2008. For a discussion of the origins of the Great 
Recession, see Baker (2008). 
4 Employment in construction peaked at about 7.7 million at the beginning of 2007, and fell more or less continually 
until January of 2011, for a total loss of more than 2 million jobs. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Employment 
Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/ces/. 
5 Economists believe that households typically spend about six cents for every dollar increase in housing wealth – and 
cut about the same for every dollar decline in housing wealth. Given the $6 trillion decline in housing wealth, this 
wealth effect would translate to an annual decline in spending of roughly $360 billion.  With GDP at roughly $14 
trillion before the crash, this $360 billion decline in consumption represents about 2.5 percent of GDP. The 
subsequent stock-market crash further reduced household wealth. But, stock ownership is more heavily concentrated 
in upper-income households whose consumption is less sensitive to changes in their wealth. The typical estimate of 
wealth effects on changes in stock prices is about three cents on the dollar. At this rate, the $6 trillion decline in share 
prices further lowered consumption about $180 billion, just over one percent of GDP. 
6 Structural unemployment can also result from other factors including overly generous unemployment benefits that 
discourage the unemployed from looking for or accepting jobs. 
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The first argument in favor of “structural unemployment” focuses on construction workers. 
According to this view, the bursting of the housing bubble left behind a large supply of construction 
workers who will never find work in construction again and who also lack the skills needed to find 
new jobs in other sectors of the economy.  
 
The second argument is that falling house prices have reduced the mobility of unemployed workers. 
Many of those who lost their jobs are also “underwater” on their mortgages, that is, what they can 
reasonably expect to get for their house is less than the unpaid balance on their mortgage. This 
situation has created “housing lock” where unemployed workers, who would otherwise relocate to 
regions with jobs, are stuck in high unemployment areas.7 
 
In this report, we use data from the Census Bureau’s Displaced Workers Survey (DWS) to examine 
evidence on both of these links between the housing market and structural unemployment.8 The 
DWS is a biennial survey, conducted as part of the Current Population Survey (CPS), that studies 
the experience of “long-tenured displaced workers.” As defined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS), displaced workers are “persons 20 years of age and older who lost or left jobs because their 
plant or company closed or moved, there was insufficient work for them to do, or their position or 
shift was abolished.” Following the BLS, we focus on “long-tenured” displaced workers, who are 
those who “worked for their employer for 3 or more years at the time of displacement.”9 The DWS 
is particularly well-suited to the analysis of economic restructuring because it tracks workers who 
lost relatively long-standing jobs for specific reasons beyond their control.  
 
 
Construction Workers 
 
The DWS data show a sharp increase in job displacement during the Great Recession (see Figure 
1). In the three years from 2007 through 2009, about one of every twenty workers was displaced 
from their job, by the fairly strict definition of displacement used by the BLS. That is, in those three 
years, 5.1 percent of workers lost a job that they had held for at least three years “because their plant 
or company closed or moved, there was insufficient work for them to do, or their position or shift 
was abolished.”10 The three-year displacement rates immediately preceding the 2010 survey were 
well above the three-year rates for earlier surveys (1994, 2002, and 2004) that also included recession 
years (1991 and 2001). 
                                                 
7 Weidner and Williamson (2011) give a succinct summary of both of these arguments: Another “...explanation is that 
the degree of mismatch between job seekers and potential employers has increased. The construction, finance, and 
real estate sectors have shrunk after the bursting of the housing bubble and the subsequent financial crisis. The skills 
of workers who used to be employed in those sectors may not be easily transferable to growing sectors such as 
education and health care... Similarly, the housing bust has left millions of homeowners underwater on their 
mortgages, which locks them into their homes and may make it more difficult for them to move to higher growth 
areas. These sectoral and geographic mismatches between workers and job openings may be making it harder for 
employers to fill vacancies.” 
8    For other recent evidence against a significant increase in structural unemployment, see Daly, Hobijn, and Valetta 
(2011), Weidner and Williams (2011), Lawrence, Shierholz, and Edwards (2010), and Jayadev and Konczal (2010). 
9 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Displaced Workers Summary, August 26, 2010, p. 1, 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/disp.nr0.htm. 
10  The denominator here is total employees in employment as of January 2010 plus all displaced workers who were not 
working as of the survey date. This measure understates the true displacement rate because the denominator includes 
all workers, not just those who have been with the same employer for three years or more. 
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FIGURE 1 
Three-year Displacement Rate, All Workers, 1994-2010 
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Source: Authors’ analysis of CPS DWS 
 
Construction workers did make up a larger share of displaced workers in 2007-2009 than was the 
case in earlier years. Of the workers displaced in the three years before the 2010 survey, 13.7 percent 
were displaced from construction jobs. This share is twice the average for construction workers in 
the 1994 through 2008 surveys (see Figure 2).  
 
FIGURE 2 
Construction Workers as Share of Displaced, 1994-2010 
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Source: Authors’ analysis of CPS DWS 
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But, a higher share of construction workers in the overall pool of displaced workers does not, on its 
own, make a case for an increase in structural unemployment. For the greater supply of construction 
workers to be raising the structural unemployment rate, at a minimum, they must be facing greater 
labor-market difficulties than other kinds of workers.  
 
Table 1 uses data from the most recent DWS to compare labor-market outcomes of workers 
displaced from construction jobs with workers displaced from jobs in all other sectors. The DWS 
data only examine the experience of construction workers who lost jobs that they had held for at 
least three years and report losing their job because their company closed, their particular position 
was abolished, or due to lack of demand. The DWS excludes all voluntary job separations or 
changes and all job losses where the worker was with the company for less than three years. 
Arguably, the experience of these “long-tenured” displaced workers is more informative about 
economic restructuring than the experience of workers with shorter attachments to their employers 
who change jobs, often voluntarily and for a host of economic and non-economic reasons. 
 
 
TABLE 1   
Labor-market Outcomes of Workers Displaced in 2007-2009, as of January 2010 
  Construction Non-construction
Since being displaced...   
Have worked (%) 56.3 55.5
Average number of jobs held 0.8 0.7
Have moved (%) 10.3 8.5
Have moved for economic reasons (%) 6.1 5.1
   
Among those displaced from a full-time job,    
at time of interview...   
Employed (%) 46.7 47.9
Unemployed (%) 42.3 38.4
Left labor force (%) 11.1 13.7
   
Among those displaced from a full-time job,    
and now employed, weekly pay at new job,    
relative to lost job... (%)   
20% or more below  38.2 38.2
20-0% below 23.2 27.3
0-20% above 20.2 19.2
20% or more above 18.5 15.2
Source: Authors’ analysis of DWS data. 
 
 
Based on the DWS data, the experience of construction workers is remarkably similar to workers 
displaced from other sectors. Slightly more construction workers (56.3 percent) than non-
construction workers (55.5 percent) found a new job at some point between the time they were 
displaced and the time they were interviewed for the DWS. On average, construction workers also 
held slightly more jobs since being displaced (0.80) than non-construction workers (0.71).  
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Construction workers also appear to be more geographically mobile than non-construction workers. 
About one-in-ten construction workers had moved to a different city or county after being displaced 
(10.3 percent), compared to only about one-in-twelve non-construction workers (8.5 percent). 
Construction workers were also more likely to “move to look for work or to take a different job” 
(6.1 percent) than workers displaced from other sectors (5.1 percent). 
 
Displaced construction workers were only slightly less likely to be employed at the time of the DWS 
interview (46.7 percent) than displaced workers from other sectors (47.9 percent). Part of the reason 
for the small difference was a higher share of construction workers in unemployment at the time of 
the interview (42.3 percent) than non-construction workers (38.4 percent). But, construction 
workers were also less likely to have left the labor force (11.1 percent) than non-construction 
workers (13.7 percent). For understanding structural change in the economy, the employment 
comparisons are more important than the unemployment and not-in-the-labor force comparisons. 
Employment rates reflect the suitability of displaced construction workers for existing jobs. By this 
measure, displaced construction workers look a lot like displaced workers from other sectors. The 
split of the rest of displaced workers likely reflects institutional features of the unemployment 
insurance system. Construction workers are more likely to be male and have above average earnings 
given their age and education level, which makes them more likely to qualify for unemployment 
insurance and therefore more likely to remain attached to the labor force (to continue to search for 
work) than to leave the labor force altogether. 
 
Displaced construction workers also appear to be as willing to accept pay cuts as workers displaced 
from other sectors. Exactly the same share of displaced, formerly full-time construction and non-
construction workers (38.2 percent) who were re-employed at the time of the DWS interview had 
taken a pay cut of more than 20 percent at their new job. Roughly comparable shares of both groups 
of workers took a pay cut of between zero and 20 percent (23.2 percent for construction, 27.3 for 
non-construction). And a slightly higher share of construction workers than non-construction 
workers earned more or substantially more at their new job. These re-employment wage 
distributions aren’t definitive, but they suggest both that construction workers are not stubbornly 
resisting pay cuts in the face of economic reality and that many construction workers have skills that 
pay even better outside the construction sector. 
 
 
“Housing Lock” 
 
A second way that the collapse of the housing market may have created “structural unemployment” 
is by reducing the geographic mobility of unemployed workers. The large declines in house prices 
experienced in many parts of the country left many households “underwater” on their mortgages. If 
they were to sell their homes, the price that they would receive would not cover the outstanding 
value of the mortgage and the generally sizable transaction costs associated with selling a house. This 
situation may have induced “housing lock” where unemployed workers, who would otherwise 
relocate to regions with more jobs, must remain in their homes in high unemployment areas. 
 
To gauge the potential size of this “housing lock” effect, we examine DWS data on whether 
displaced workers moved from their city or county after being displaced. First, we grouped states 
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according to the percent change in the state’s home price index11 following two different 
approaches. In one, we divided the 51 states (including the District of Columbia) into five groups of 
ten (with the middle group containing eleven) from largest decline to the largest increase in the state 
house price index. For the other approach, we divided states into three groups: those states that saw 
their house price index fall more than 10 percent; those that saw a decline of up to 10 percent; and 
those that saw any increase in the house price index. Next, we compared the “staying rate” – that is, 
the share of displaced workers who did not move out of their city or county after being displaced – 
across states by the size of the change in their house price index. If housing lock is causing 
“structural unemployment,” we would expect staying rates to be higher where house-price declines 
were steepest. 
 
The DWS data suggest that house prices have had almost no observable impact on displaced 
workers’ likelihood to move. Displaced workers in states that experienced a large decline in the 
house price index were no more likely to stay (90.7 percent) than were displaced workers who lost 
their jobs in states with smaller house-prices declines (91.7 percent) or house-price increases (91.8 
percent) (see Figure 3). The same is true when we divide states into five groups by the change in the 
house price index. States in all five fifths of house price changes had similar staying rates, varying 
from 90.7 to 92.6 percent (see Figure 4). Displaced workers in the ten states that saw the biggest 
house-price declines – including Nevada, California, Florida, Arizona, and Michigan – had essentially 
the same probability of not moving after displacement (90.7 percent) as displaced workers in the ten 
states with the best performing housing markets (91.5 percent). 
 
 
FIGURE 3 
Displaced Workers’ Probability of Not Moving, by Change in State-wide Housing Price Index 
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Source: Author’s analysis of CPS DWS and Federal Housing Finance Agency data. 
 
                                                 
11 Federal Housing Finance Agency, Seasonally Adjusted Purchase Only Index for States: 
http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=87.  
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FIGURE 4 
Displaced Workers’ Probability of Not Moving, by Change in State-wide Housing Price Index, Quintiles 
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Source: Author’s analysis of CPS DWS and Federal Housing Finance Agency data. 
 
 
Even if “housing lock” were a more serious problem, it might still be possible to address it using 
expansionary macroeconomic policy. Unemployment related to housing lock may be “structural” in 
some sense, but the structural barrier is in the housing market, not the labor or product markets. 
The overall economy is not contracting in some areas and expanding in others for reasons reflecting 
changes across regions in tastes, technology, or trade (and independent of the housing market). 
Structural changes motivated by these kinds of factors arguably might suggest relocating labor across 
regions. What is happening in the current business cycle, instead, appears to be that some regional 
markets have experienced local declines in demand that are related to the collapse in the housing 
market. A resurgence of demand at the national level, as would happen with expansionary 
macroeconomic policies, would potentially restore demand in depressed regions without requiring 
workers to relocate and without creating inflationary pressures. 
 
 
Lack of Demand 
 
The DWS data provide little support for the view that features of the Great Recession have 
produced a significant rise in “structural unemployment.” Additional evidence from the DWS 
reinforces this conclusion and suggests that the main problem facing the labor market is a sharp 
decline in aggregate demand. Figure 5 shows the main reason for job displacement reported in each 
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of the Displaced Worker Surveys between 1994 and 2010.12 The most striking feature of graph is the 
large increase in 2010, relative to every earlier survey, in the share of workers displaced because of 
“insufficient work,” a category that is arguably most closely consistent with a demand-side 
explanation for current high levels of unemployment.13 The DWS data, however, are not definitive 
in this respect: at the firm level, where workers experience displacement, “insufficient demand” 
might reflect a decline in aggregate demand or a structural shift in demand. What is interesting about 
the 2010 survey is the large jump in the share of workers citing “insufficient demand” relative to 
earlier recessions. 
 
 
FIGURE 5 
Reason for Displacement, All Workers, 1994-2010 
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Source: Authors’ analysis of CPS DWS 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12  Workers are classified as displaced only if they report one of these three reasons for losing the job they held for at 
least three years. Other reported reasons, which the BLS excludes from the “displaced” classification are: “seasonal 
job ended”; “self-operated business” ended; and “other.” 
13  The DWS data are consistent with more detailed data from the regular monthly survey of small businesses 
conducted by National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), which has shown a large increase since the 
recession began in the share of small businesses that report “poor sales” as the single most important problem facing 
their business. The same survey also shows a substantial decline in the share of businesses that report “quality of 
labor” as their biggest problem. For a recent analysis, see Sairah Husain, “Structural Unemployment: The Data Just 
Doesn’t Match Up,” CEPR Blog, March 2, 2011, http://www.cepr.net/index.php/blogs/cepr-blog/structural-
unemployment-the-data-just-doesnt-match-up. 
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Conclusion 
 
The DWS data suggest that the bursting of the housing bubble – the central cause of the economic 
downturn and the ensuing financial crisis – has not generated any noticeable increase in “structural 
unemployment.”  
 
Construction workers have indeed suffered disproportionately in the downturn, but they have also 
been at least as successful in coping with the hostile labor market of recent years as workers 
displaced from other sectors. Construction workers’ skills are at least as well matched to the 
available jobs as workers displaced elsewhere in the economy. 
 
The downturn in the housing market also appears to have had no measurable effect on the 
geographical mobility of displaced workers, but the economic effects are small, raising the pool of 
the unemployed by only a few percent (and the unemployment rate, by a much smaller amount). 
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Appendix 
 
The DWS is a survey of job displacement administered every other year since 1984, in January or 
February, as part of the Bureau of the Census’ Current Population Survey (CPS). The CPS is a 
monthly survey of 50,000 to 60,000 households (used for, among other purposes, to calculate the 
official unemployment rate). In the DWS, since 1994, all participants in the CPS age 20 and older 
were asked if they had any experience of job displacement during the preceding three years (before 
the 1994 survey, respondents were asked about any experience of job displacement during the 
preceding five years). Workers who reported that they had experienced job loss due to “plant 
closing,” “slack demand,” or “position or shift abolished” were then asked a series of detailed 
follow-up questions about the lost job, their post-displacement experience, and their current 
economic situation.  
 
This report uses the versions of the survey, for 1994-2010, which cover job losses during the period 
1991 to 2009. The main focus here is on the survey for 2010, which covers the period 2007-2009. 
Changes in the recall period for the survey make comparisons before and after 1992 difficult. (See 
Farber, 2003, for an attempt to create a consistent series of job displacement across the change in 
the DWS.) The survey underwent additional, though minor, changes between 1994 and 1996, and 
has been essentially identical since 1996. Using the BLS’s definition of displacement, the annual 
breakdown of the sample size of displaced workers is: 1994: 2,303; 1996: 1,677; 1998: 1,496; 2000: 
1,322; 2002: 1,831; 2004: 2,207; 2006: 1,606; 2008: 1,481; 2010: 2,751. 
 
The manufacturing sector includes a small portion of workers in mining. The service sector includes 
transportation, communications, and utilities.  
 
All data and programs used are available for download at http://www.ceprdata.org. 
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